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country. The complete enfeeblement of tourism has also led to some migration and to an accompanying decline of services and service "industries" in the capital. These losses have surely hurt Haiti and have damaged its chances for growth as well as its capacity to maintain the health, education, and morale of its people. It is not clear, however, to what extent such changes may have produced a negative political reaction to the Duvalier regime. Urban support for Dr. Duvalier appears to have come from some intellectuals, from some army officers, and from portions of the urban lower classes; but numerically most important were those low-paid but literate and aspiring wage-earners whom the Comhaire-Sylvains (1959) refer to as "Class III" members. These observers have stressed that the Class III group consisted mainly of industrial employees, those engaged in food-processing, hotel services, workshops, and the like. It was this group that the Comhaire-Sylvains credited with the Duvalier victory in 1957, pointing out in addition that "in the small country towns almost all officials, both civil and military, and traders, seemed to belong to this class" (p. 185). If the economic crisis that has gripped Haiti in recent years severely affects the position of this class, the political situation will reflect as much. But the ideology of Class III members—so far as it can be inferred at all—would suggest that one Duvalier may merely be replaced by another. At the same time, the depopulation of those groupings whose members might have led a qualitatively different kind of opposition, during the period of tenure of the United States Marine Corps Mission to Duvalier, may have indefinitely postponed the opportunity for creating a genuinely new political direction.

To state it another way, there are no signs at this time that the regime in power will be pulled down by any organized Haitian opposition. More important, since regimes resting on a narrow popular base have a way of falling without change, there is no indication that within Haiti's present national institutional structure, a genuine opposition to Duvalier-type governments can take shape. This means that even if regime should follow regime in rapid succession, there is little reason to expect that any of them could effect fundamental changes in Haitian society. If such an interpretation is correct, it presupposes an internal equilibrium or stasis so strong that no force for change in half a century has been able to make a politically significant difference.

This pessimistic view is supported by what is known at this time

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A revolution directed by a general of real ambition was likely to involve an appeal to foreign powers. Haiti being almost roadless, ships were important for moving troops and blockading seaports. Many a chieftain has purchased six or eight ships abroad, and with this "navy" won his fight. Financial intrigue was frequent. By borrowing money from France, Germany, or England, with the promise to reshape Haitian financial policy to the benefit of the creditor country, several revolutionaries have secured funds for arms and the necessary soldiers to effect a coup. Sooner or later also one might expect to see the Môle Saint Nicolas, which guards the Windward Passage pathway between Cuba and Haiti, come into the picture. Cession of the Mole has frequently been held out as bait for foreign support, but popular opposition to white ownership of any Haitian land has always stopped actual cession. When Haiti's debt to Germany was due, she borrowed from France to pay it, and then later borrowed from the United States to pay France. All such appeals to foreign powers have merely drawn attention to the defenseless position of the country; many a successful revolutionary chief has lived to regret his appeal for aid.[19]

The one time between 1804 and 1915 when political opinion was vocal and truly significant was in the latter years of Boyer's administration. Then it took pains to attack specific evils with steady persistence, even though the cures suggested were vague. Yet after the successful elimination of Boyer, politicians who had worked so brilliantly in the opposition showed themselves even more incapable. Political thought, at a low ebb for the next forty years, revived only when, after 1883, the Liberals were eliminated from politics. Their complete defeat seems to have given elite thinkers time for sober reflection upon the plight of their country. Before 1843 the critics had been in a position to make their words effective; after 1883 they wrote—soberly, brilliantly, persuasively—but their books and pamphlets were read only by a small group of fellow aristocrats who already thought as they did, or disagreed with them in print. Political homilies made no impression upon the minds of the peasants left uneducated by all the elite presidents of Haiti.

In the crucial days of the American Occupation, once again political debate rose to brilliant heights. The rude shock of seeing foreign

19. See, on this whole subject of Haiti's foreign relations, an excellent chapter in Montague, *op. cit.*, chap. IX.

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Foreign relations, in the political sense, revolved during most of

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the nineteenth century about loans and insurrections. Haiti maintained legations in those countries to which she exported most of her coffee and from which she might obtain credit. Revolutionary leaders sometimes promised as a bait for foreign assistance either tariff preferences or the cession of Môle Saint Nicolas for a naval base; if successful, they might fulfill the first promise but, because of the Monroe Doctrine and the watchful jealousy of the big powers, the Môle was never ceded. The United States had varied dealings with Haiti. Before the Civil War there was more than one movement to transplant freed slaves from this country to Haiti; after the war the United States came very near annexing Haiti; and negotiations over the cession of the Môle did not end until America acquired Guantánimo Bay, across the Windward Passage in Cuba, as a naval base to guard the entrance to the Caribbean.[1]

It was finally the combination of complicated economic affairs and political collapse which produced the Occupation of 1915. In the preceding year both France and Germany threatened to send warships to collect loans due them, and were stopped only by the outbreak of the World War. An American bank held as its subsidiary the Bank of Haiti, in which the government deposited its funds; when in 1914–15 the presidents followed each other in rapid succession, the bank on instructions from New York refused to allow the government to withdraw its funds. Haiti in retaliation threatened to seize its deposits by force, but the New York bank persuaded the United States government to send a ship to transfer the gold from Port-au-Prince to New York. There were other financial complications, particularly those relating to defaulted payments to a railroad company. What finally precipitated the Occupation, however, was anarchy. When, in July, 1915, President Sam slaughtered 168 political prisoners and was himself mobbed and murdered, the American government ordered the landing of its Marines from a warship conveniently anchored in the harbor near Port-au-Prince.[2]

From 1915 to 1934 the foreign affairs of Haiti were under the direction of the United States, whose main concern was to order the economic relations of the country in such fashion that Haiti should

1. The foreign relations of Haiti with the United States have been clearly treated in Ludwell L. Montague, *Haiti and the United States, 1714–1938*.

2. One of the best accounts of the events leading up to the Occupation is that of H. P. Davis, *Black Democracy*.

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not find herself constantly embroiled with European states and American financial interests. The Haitian debt was funded, and a financial adviser remained in the country even after the Occupation came to an end. It is expected that by 1943 the last debt will be paid; the financial adviser, however, withdrew in 1941. Since the Occupation, although the republic has been free to manage her own affairs, she has consulted frequently with the State Department in Washington.

Nineteen years of occupation ended the century of Haitian isolation. The Americans built roads, conducted health campaigns, made their presence felt even in remote hamlets and valleys. American authors, political, romantic, and sensational, discovered the Antillean republic. Steamship companies stopped their cruises for a few hours at Cap-Haïtien to allow tourists to visit the Citadel, and at Port-au-Prince to see the sights of the capital. Every Haitian now realizes that there is a world outside.

Whatever crises have arisen in Haitian affairs, certain problems have persisted. For whom do they constitute a source of worry? Since the government has always been a dictatorship, limited or absolute, subject to no party control, the incumbents of office have never had the experience of being constantly reminded by their opponents of the misery or daily worries of the population. After a hundred years the people have learned that relief is not to be expected from politicians. Occasionally a dramatic revolutionary leader has persuaded some of the people that the officials in power were responsible for their distress, and so worked up a following; yet even when such movements succeeded, the masses never benefited. To most governments of the past century Haiti's problem has been only one: to frustrate insurrection. There is evidence that recent administrations have busied themselves assiduously with the country's internal problems, although none of them has been adequately solved. The elite, at least as a group, do not feel any apparent responsibility for the maladjustments, nor obligation to effect the necessary reforms. A few patriots, and those almost without exception not in office, know what ails the country and say so; a smaller number propose reasonable solutions. The problems remain. Of these the three outstanding are overpopulation with all its accompanying ills, health, and education.